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The problem with 'dots': 
Questioning the role of rationality in the online environment 
Abstract 
5HJXODWRU\ WKHRULVWV RIWHQ XVH WKH µGRW¶ DV D PHWDSKRU WR KHOS FRQFHSWXDOLVH WKHLU
models of a given environment/HVVLJ IDPRXVO\XVHG WKH µSDWKHWLFGRW¶ LQKLVFODVVLF
³&RGHDQG2WKHU/DZVRI&\EHUVSDFH´DQG0XUUD\¶V³5HJXODWLRQRI&\EHUVSDFH´XVHG
interconnected dots to help describe networked communitarianism and to discuss the 
effectiveness and implementation of symbiotic regulation. However in both models, the 
dot is seen as a rational DFWRU7KHUDWLRQDOµGRW¶LVSUHVXPHGWRKDYHDFRPSOHWHVHWRI
preferences and the ability to gather all the necessary information in order to make an 
informed decision that optimally reflect their choices and preferences. However, 
research from psychology and increasingly economics has shown that humans are 
often prone to making errors in judgements. The paper argues that using the metaphor 
of dots to describe how rational actors behave in the digital environment is problematic. 
Actors deploy heuristics when making judgements resulting in systematic errors and 
biases, often compromising assumptions of the regulator. Accordingly, the way actors 
behave in the online environment is not rational at all; thus, models built on rationality 
start from a false premise.  
Introduction 
Rational choice describes not only a normative standard, but an empirical model of 
behaviour. It not only forms the core of the economic approach to human behaviour, it is 
also the most influential philosophical account of practical rationality. At its core, 
rationality is rooted in the claim that humans make optimal decisions when clear 
information is provided. However, there are recurring questions about the scope of 
rational choice theory in philosophy and, increasingly, in economics. This is because not 
only do users not have access to all information, they often make no attempt to seek it 
RXW+XPDQVDUHQRWRPQLSRWHQWEHLQJVDQG µPD[LPLVLQJXWLOLW\¶ LV impossible. Human 
beings do not calculate all possible risks, nor do we compute all the necessary 
calculations. 
In order to conceptualise their theories, Lessig, Murray, and Laidlaw deployed simple 
elementary models that symbolize how nodes may be affected by regulation. 1 
Regardless of whatever difficulties arise, their models represent a major normative 
ideal; in both, an action is rational if and only if it maximizes the agent's expected utility, 
and a decision is rational if and only if the action which it is a decision to perform 
maximizes the agent's expected utility. Whereas the concept of the decision-maker is 
the rational actor in standard economics, more realistic behavioural models assume the 
actor is, at the very least, quasi-rational, influenced by the context of the moment of 
decision-making (Locke 1841).2  Any actor's preferences and cognition are subject to 
social contexts to which he has become exposed and accustomed to and to cultural 
models²LQFOXGLQJ ³FDWHJRULHV LGHQWLWLHV QDUUDWLYHV DQG ZRUOGYLHZV²that he uses to 
SURFHVV LQIRUPDWLRQ´ (DiMaggio 1997, 274)  +RII DQG 6WLJOLW] DUJXH WKDW ³WKH VRFLDO
context not only primes individuals, eliciting one kind of behaviour or another, but that in 
a fundamental sense it shapes them²KRZ WKH\ WKLQN DQG ZKDW WKH\ ZDQW´ (Hoff and 
Stiglitz 2015).   
As a matter of FRQYHQLHQFH UHJXODWRU\ WKHRULVWVRIWHQXVH WKH µGRW¶ DVDPHWDSKRU WR
help conceptualise rationality-EDVHGPRGHOV7KHUDWLRQDOµGRW¶LQ/HVVLJ0XUUD\PRGHOV
is either presumed to have a complete set of preferences (Lessig, 1998) or the ability to 
gather all the necessary information in order to make an informed decision that 
optimally reflect their choices and preferences (Murray, 2007). The first part of the 
article provides a brief review of prevailing models for regulating the online environment, 
focusVLQJRQUDWLRQDOLW\¶VUROH.  The second part analyses the appropriateness of rational 
actors in regulatory models for the online environment. The third part examines the role 
of heuristics in judgement making, before concluding with an analysis of potential 
implications for regulators that assume the online environment is made up of rational 
actors.   
Stepping back through existing cyber-regulatory models  
Rationality underpins cyber-regulatory models, featuring in /HVVLJ¶VORQHµSDWKHWLFGRW¶DW
RQHHQGRIWKHVSHFWUXPWRWKHPRUHFRPSOH[³QHWZRUNHGFRPPXQLWDULDQLVP´SURSRVHG
by Andrew Murray to WKH µJDWHNHHSHU PRGHO¶ SURSRVHG E\ (PLO\ /DLGODZ (Laidlaw, 
2010). Although some of these models fit neatly into traditional forms of governance, the 
IRFDO SRLQW KDV DOZD\V EHHQ RQ WKH VRYHUHLJQ SRZHU¶V DELOLW\ WR PDQGDWH de-facto 
standards at each layer of the online environment, to gather information, and modify 
behaviour through various regulatory controls (Morgan and Yeung, 2007). /HVVLJ¶V
DVVXPSWLRQ WKDW µGRWV¶ VWD\ SDVVLYH DQG FDQ EH FRQWUROOHG E\ D YDULHW\ RI UHJXODWRU\
modalities is reflected in his now famous modalities of regulation: law, market, 
architecture (code) and social norms (Lessig, 1998).  As the omniscient or perfectly 
UDWLRQDOGRWLQ/HVVLJ¶VPRGHOEHFRPHVHQWLUHO\SUHGLFWDEOHWKHUHJXODWRUVKRXOGEHDEOH
WRSUHGLFWWKHGRW¶VFKRLFHV7KLVLVODUJHO\GXHWRWKHLQIHUHQFHWKDWGRWVKDYHERWKWKH
capacity and knowledge to make proper judgements.  
0XUUD\¶V use of the dot metaphor reframeV /HVVLJ¶V PHWDSKRU IRU the digital 
communications society (Murray, 2007). When a regulator wants to understand how a 
thing comes to be, they tend to search for some sort of social power acting as an 
enabler. When looking at 0XUUD\¶VPRGHOWKURXJKWKLVOHQVWKHfallacy in /HVVLJ¶V claim 
that nodes are static becomes more obvious. In reality, nodes in the online environment 
are at any given moment, activated and deactivated, dynamically created and 
recreated, rather than sitting in a constant form. 0XUUD\¶VZRUN LGHQWLILHG WKDW/HVVLJ¶V
thesis LQFRUUHFWO\ DVVXPHG WKDW UHJXODWRU\ VHWWOHPHQWV GR QRW FRPH IURP D µVHWWOHG
VWDWH¶Chaos in the online environment does not give regulators the luxury of time to 
positively consider policy considerations. Murray also posited that there are clear 
similarities between nodal governance theory, the theory of the post-regulatory state, 
/HVVLJ¶V WKHRU\ RI F\EHU-paternalism and his version of network communitarianism. 
What each hints at but does not completely address is where the divergent centres of 
power are to be found (Murray, 2011). This is one of the keys to effective governance in 
the online environment$FFRUGLQJO\WKH,QWHUQHW*DWHNHHSHULQ/DLGODZ¶VPRGHOKROGVD
particularly importanW SRVLWLRQ /DLGODZ DUJXHV WKDW ³SXUVXDQW WR QHWZRUN JDWHNHHSLQJ
theory online, gatekeeping is the process of controlling information as it moves through 
DJDWHDQGWKHJDWHNHHSHUVDUHWKHLQVWLWXWLRQVRU LQGLYLGXDOVWKDWFRQWURO WKLVSURFHVV´ 
(Laidlaw, 2010)  0XUUD\ DGGV ³,nternet gatekeepers are being used to regulate in 
accordance with the traditional nodal governance model: the harnessing of 
communicative power by external regulators to achieve a regulatory settlement through 
the capture of a key gatekeeper as a regulatory proxy´ (Murray, 2010)  
+RZHYHUWUDQVSRVLQJ/DLGODZ¶VJDWHNHHSHUPRGHOIRUnodal entities and applying them 
WR LQGLYLGXDO XVHUV ZRXOG UHVXOW LQ D PRGHO VR FRPSOH[ ³WKDW WKH HIIHFWV RI UHJXODWRU\
LQWHUYHQWLRQ FDQQRW EH SUHGLFWHG´ (Reed 2012, 220) In order to have an effective 
regulatory framework, regulators would be forced not only to understand the 
complexities of interactions between users, but WKDWXVHU¶VFRPPXQLW\¶VYDOXHVDQGtheir 
norms. The regulator would have to understand the normative demands of every 
regulator in every jurisdiction with a claim over WKHXVHU¶Vinteractions with both markets 
and code (Reed 2012).  
All of the aforementioned approaches all consider technology as the determining factor 
in user behaviour. Unfortunately, this sort of techno-determinism undermines user 
autonomy (Black 2001). If Murray is correct in his claim that dots are ³DFWLYH´ DQG LI
HDFKGRWLQ/DLGODZ¶VUHJXODWRU\PDWUL[LVDJUDYLWDWLRQDOQRGHWKHQWKHUHPXVWEHVRPH
validity to crLWLFLVP WKDW ³DJHQF\´EH LPSXWHG solely to technology, without considering 
the role of the Internet actor in relation to the technology used by Internet actors in the 
DFWLYHPDWUL[,IRQHZDVWRDGRSW/HVVLJ¶VPRGHOXVLQJFRGHWRFRQWUROEHKDYLRXUZRXOG
be a moot point if users migrate away from a specific technology en masse. 
Furthermore, if users are governed by powerful nodes in a network then the assumption 
Laidlaw makes is that users must visit a specific gatekeeper. Murray goes to lengths to 
admit that his theory does not address this. Reed suggested that ODZPDNHUV³H[DPLQH
the law-PDNLQJSURSRVDO IURP WKHSRLQWRIYLHZRI WKHF\EHUVSDFHDFWRU´ (Reed 2012, 
221) EHIRUHDVNLQJWZRTXHVWLRQV)LUVWO\ZLOOWKHDFWRUUHVSHFWWKHODZPDNHU¶VDXWKRULW\
over this area of cyberspace activity? And secondly, will the actor recognize the 
obligations set out in the law as having some sensible meaning? Secondly, Reed calls 
IRU ³ODZPDNHUV WR XQGHUVWDQG WKH HQYLURQPHQW LQ ZKLFK WKH F\EHUVSDFH DFWRU LV
RSHUDWLQJ´ (Reed 2012, 221).  
,W LV QRW FOHDU ZKHWKHU 5HHG LV UHIHUULQJ WR WKH ³HQYLURQPHQW´ LQFOXVLYH RI both ³UHDO
ZRUOG´ DQG RQOLQH HQYLURQPHQWs or whether he is simply referring to the cyberspace 
environment singularly. He argues that a heuristics-based (Reed 2012) approach to 
law-making ZLOO ³JUHDWO\ LQFUHDVH WKH SUREDELOLW\´ RI FRPSOLDQFH LQ WKH RQOLQH
environment. Furthermore, Reed relies on the social norm that people generally like 
REH\LQJWKHODZEXWDUJXHVODZPDNHUVVKRXOGDGRSWWKHDSSURDFK³DVSDUWRIDZLder 
normative framework that guides the activities of cyberspace users´.  This leads to an 
interpretation of Reed as only referring to the use of the heuristic approach in the online 
environment.  
Reed correctly asserts that current approaches to regulating cybeUVSDFHDFWLYLW\DWµXVHU
OHYHO¶ ignore other normative pressures on the actor, generally accepted cyberspace 
norms, other rules by that lawmaker; and by other lawmakers which claim jurisdiction 
over the DFWRU¶VDFWLYLWLHV7KLVDSSURDFKLQDVXEWOHway, still views cyberspace in the 
same light as the early cyber-frontiersman: that the Internet is to be viewed in isolation 
IURPWKHUHDOZRUOG/HVVLJDQG=LWWUDLQIRFXVHGRQWKH³technology" behind the Internet, 
\HW0XUUD\DQG/DLGODZ¶V IRFXVRQQRGDOgovernance still focuses on 'gatekeepers' as 
agents of control.   Both Murray DQG /DLGODZ¶V WKHVHV are limited to regulation of a 
dynamic matrix. Reed views cyberspace in the same manner, albeit disagreeing with 
Murray's interpretation of the Internet's complexity as a barrier that cannot be overcome.  
Regardless of which regulatory model one gravitates toward, there are two common 
threads: firstly, they refuse to acknowledge the behaviour of the activated dot. The way 
users behave in the online environment has largely been reduced to generic phrases 
OLNH µSDVVLYLW\¶ RU µDFWLYDWLRQ¶ )RU H[DPSOH /HVVLJ¶V WKHRU\ RI WKH µSDWKHWLF GRW¶ VLWV LQ
VWDUN FRQWUDVW WR 0XUUD\¶V ZHE RI ³FRQQHFWHG GRWV´ LQ D PDWUL[  )RU WKH QHWZRUN
communitarian, the regulator is only warned that actions to affect any single node on 
their polycentric web, can easily affect all the other nodes within the same system. The 
second assumption that Lessig (Lessig 1998), Murray and Laidlaw make is that actors 
in their network ultimately behave rationally. ,Q/HVVLJ0XUUD\DQG/DLGODZ¶VWKHRULHV
WKH ³SDWKHWLF´ DQG ³FRQQHFWHG GRWV´ UHSUHVHQW rational actors. For Lessig and Murray, 
WKH DFWRU¶V rationality is crucial to the decision to regulate. This is because rational 
choice underpins their regulatory theories ± when people are acting irrationally in the 
online environment, regulation is often justified.  
Rationality 
If one opens a book on rational choice, one is likely to find advice along the lines of, 
³ORRNEHIRUH\RXOHDS´RU³DQDO\VHEHIRUH\RXDFW´)RUWKHGLVLQWHUHVWHGUDWLRQDOLVWIDFHG
with having to make a decision, the only appropriate way to proceed is to list all the 
rewards/benefits, look for all the consequences/costs, in order to determine the most 
appropriate, yet rational way of proceeding. For the rational economist, by comparing 
options available through the use of probability, outcomes become predictable. Thomas 
%D\HV¶ theorem showed how a subjective degree of belief should change rationally 
when presented with evidence (Bayes and Price 1763). For neo-classical economists, 
people's behaviour is explained in terms of rational choices, constrained by prices and 
incomes. The neo-classical economist accepts individuals' preferences as givens. 
3UHGLFWLRQV DERXW EHKDYLRXU DUH URRWHG LQ ³PHWKRGRORJLFDO LQGLYLGXDOLVP´ DQG LWV
assumption that people will behave rationally when making decisions under uncertainty 
(Hayek 1948). These predictions about human behaviour are reduced to formulas which 
are said to give us insight into how people should behave. However, Bayesian formulas 
may be a useful and practical mathematic scheme for helping to understand judgement, 
but they do not describe how most people actually think in their day-to-day lives. For 
example, people tend to behave differently after they have accumulated wealth, than 
during the accumulation phase (Kahneman and Tversky 1979).  
Rational choice permeates legal theory, legal decision-making, and legal policy-making 
(Friedman 1953; Friedman & Schwartz 1986; Friedman 1955; Hastie & Dawes 2010). It 
is based on the assumption that humans not only want to maximise the relative utility of 
decisions, but will make choices that do so. Within this assumption, there are two 
descriptive claims: The first concerns our cognitive abilities. Individuals make decisions 
more or less accurately assess (at least within the limits of the information they have 
rationally decided to weigh in making said decision), the probability of various possible 
outcomes to which decisions may lead to, including probability of their own future state 
of satisfaction or well-being in relation to routes they choose. The second descriptive 
claim embedded is motivational: Once calculations of net gains and losses are made, 
each one of us chooses to act in a way that maximises our own utility, arranging our 
social lives to satisfy as many of these self-desires as possible.  
Yet rational choice theory dominated the latter part of the 20th &HQWXU\¶V SROLF\
landscape (Kelman 2011) and underpins our frameworks for understanding and 
modelling social and economic behaviour (Blume and Easley 2008). Interpreted as 
"wanting more rather than less of a good", rationality is widely used as an assumption of 
the behaviour of individuals in microeconomic models and analysis and appears in 
almost all economics textbook treatments of human decision-making. Kelman recounts 
how rational choice theory has dominated policy design and evaluation before arguing 
that this needs to be re-thought and moderated. He offers plenty of examples: (i) 
providing more information about the cost-benefits of consequences fails to change 
behaviour; (ii) where changing direct incentives (consequences) fails to change 
behaviour; (iii) where self-control, not choice, is the critical determinant of behaviour.  
After recognising that full rationality could only be achieved if human beings had 
unlimited cognitive abilities, evidence began to highlight the fact that human very rarely 
followed rules initially posited by Bayes and in reality, our behaviour deviates 
substantially from rationality (Kahneman, Slovic and Tversky 1982; Kahneman and 
Tversky 1984).3 
Bounded Rationality 
Even the most hardened rationalist would recognise the folly in thinking that human 
EHLQJV ZHUH ³IXOO\ UDWLRQDO %D\HVLDQ RI VXEMHFWLYH XWLOLW\´ (Gigerenzer and Reinhard 
Selten 2002).  The value of expected utility theory as a descriptive model for actual 
individual behaviour has long been contested (Thaler 1991). Herbert Simon argued that 
rational utility maximising behaviour is limited by various factors, such as gradual 
satisfaction in cases of increasing wealth and by the principles of logic (Simon 1957). 
6LPRQ¶V SUHPLVH RI ³ERXQGHG UDWLRQDOLW\´ VXJJHVWV WKDW LQGLYLGXDOV ORRN DW D OLPLWHG
range of solutions in a given problem and then accept the first satisfactory one. Sitting in 
opposition to unbounded rationally, which views people as omnipotent beings capable 
of computing all of the possibilities, bounded rationality is an explanation for how people 
make decisions about optimisation under constraints and refers to the rational principles 
that underlie non-optimizing adaptive behaviour of people. Rubenstein classifies 
decision models categorised as bounded rational models as explicitly incorporating 
procedural elements of decision making that are absent from standard models of 
rational choice (Rubenstein 1998). For Gilboa and Schmeidler, bounded rationality is a 
way to judge decision-making quality: a decision is not rational if it embarrasses the 
decision maker once the situation is explained to him (Gilboa and Schmeidler 2001).  
Models of bounded rationality address the following question: How do people make 
decisions in the real world, where time is short, knowledge lacking, and other resources 
limited? Bounded rationality theorists argue that, rather than using unlimited information, 
we add limiting parameters to help make our decision making easier. Some theorists 
UHIHU WR WKLV DV ³WKH UHSDLU SURJUDP´ (Bernoulli 1954, 23) 6LPRQ¶V WKHRU\ RI ERXQGHG
rationality also demands an inquiry into the following normative question: How do make 
people make decisions when optimisation is out of reach in an uncertain world and asks 
several descriptive questions: (1) wKDWLVLQWKH³DGDSWLYHWRROER[´RIDSHUVRQDQGRUD
culture? (Gigerenzer, Gerd and Todd, 1999, 563)4 This is because some rules of thumb 
are hard wired, in part, through evolution. For example, bees make a collective decision 
about where to build a new hive (Seeley 2001). (2) What rules of thumb do individuals 
use? Are these social or individual rules of thumb?  Or in the alternative, did the mental 
shortcut come about through individual learning or through social processes? (Snook, 
Taylor and Bennell 2004) Rieskamp and Otto determined people select strategies they 
expect to be successful in solving problems. However, instead of assuming that people 
GHOLEHUDWHO\ WUDGH RII VWUDWHJLHV¶ FRVWV DQG EHQHILWV WKHLU WKHRU\ VWDWHV WKDW WKH
VWUDWHJLHV¶H[SHFWDQFLHVDUHWKHUHVXOWRIDlearning process (Rieskamp 2008).(3) Is the 
rule of thumb chosen by thH VXEMHFW ³HFRORJLFDOO\ UDWLRQDO´"  Our memory determines 
which rules of thumb can be used, and some have applicability that appears to be 
FRUUHODWHGZLWK WKHLU ³HFRORJLFDO UDWLRQDOLW\´ ³$ UXOHRI WKXPE LVHFRORJLFDOO\ UDWLRQDO WR
the degree that it is adDSWHGWRWKHVWUXFWXUHRIWKHHQYLURQPHQW´DQG³DKHXULVWLFLVQRW
good or bad, rational or irrational per se, only relative to an environment. It can exploit 
FHUWDLQ VWUXFWXUHV RI HQYLURQPHQWV RU FKDQJH DQ HQYLURQPHQW´ (Gigerenzer and 
Gaissmaier 2011, 451)   
7KH VWXG\ RI ³HFRORJLFDO UDWLRQDOLW\´ DGGUHVVHV WZR UHODWHG TXHVWLRQV +RZ GRHV
cognition exploit environmental structures, and how does it deal with error? Ecological 
rationalists ask why a mind should waste time and effort in estimating the optimal 
weights of cues if they do not matter or even detract from performance. It is the idea of 
rationality measured by performance, not procedure. This is because human cognition 
is linked to past environments and how we have evolved in response to those 
environments. A match between a rule of thumb and an environmental structure does 
not necessary imply that the rule evolved because of that environment. Therefore, 
research into the ecological rationality seeks to determine in what environments a 
simple rule of thumb will work better than computing through entire multiple regression 
models. The second query bounded rationality asked is a normative one: In what world 
will a rule of thumb work and in which will it fail? Studying judgement in an uncertain 
world allows you to ask the empirical question: when is it better to choose rules of 
thumb rather than having to rely on a Bayesian formula? Secondly, in environments 
where rules of thumb produce better outcomes than rationality, how can regulators and 
policy-makers use this information accordingly?    
Regardless of the arguments for a bounded rational perspective, most economic 
theories, including those relating to the economics of the online environment assume 
that individuals act as rational decision makers solving problems according to objective 
standards. Bounded rationality is the starting point for behavioural economics which 
was developed as a reaction to utility theory (Simon 1958)  ,QVSLUHG E\ 6LPRQ¶V
SUHPLVHRI ³ERXQGHG UDWLRQDOLW\´ EHKDYLRXUDO HFRQRPLVWVK\SRthesised that the actual 
behaviour of individuals systematically differs from rational choice.  
A Challenge to Rationality 
Moving away from well-established theories of rationality and responsive regulation 
(Baldwin, Cave and Lodge 2011), new theories of ³SUREOHP-FHQWUHG´ DSSURDFKHV WR
regulatory compliance have been developed; largely in part to perceived failings in the 
assumption in classical economic thinking that only economic optimization is in play. 
This is due to the fact that classical economists have largely ignored a myriad of other 
factors, large and small, that our minds are attempting to integrate simultaneously. 
Moreover, increasing attention has been paid to motivations and behavioural (Sunstein 
and Thaler 2008; Jolls, Sunstein and Thaler 2008) approaches to regulatory 
enforcement.5  
Two challenges to the theory of rationality and the rational actor emanate from the field 
of cognitive psychology. The Heuristics and Biases School (H&B) led by the pioneering 
work of Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky (Tversky and Kahneman 1982) and the 
Fast & Frugal School (F&F) led by the work of Gird Gigerenzer (Gigerenzer 1999) 
originated as participants in an intra-disciplinary debate that have yielded insight into 
both law and policy-making. The H&B School deYHORSHG IURP ³SURVSHFW WKHRU\´ DIWHU
Kahneman and Tversky discovered that different framing of the same prospect led to 
notable differences in choices (Kahneman and Tversky 1979). A series of experiments 
revealed that actual choice problems revealed three patterns:  
1. Gains are treated differently than losses. Except for very small probabilities, 
risk seeking is observed for losses and risk aversion for gains (Hirshleifer and 
Riley 1992).  
2. Outcomes received with certainty are valued higher relative to uncertain ones 
(Arkes and Blumer 2000).  
3. The way in which a given problem is formulated has an impact on the outcome 
(Kahneman and Tversky 2000).  
In his speech made when collecting his Nobel Prize, Kahneman stated that his research 
³DWWHPSWHG WRREWDLQa map of bounded rationality, by exploring the systematic biases 
that separate the beliefs that people have and the choices they make from the optimal 
beliefs and choices assumed in rational-DJHQW PRGHOV´ (Kahneman 2003). Before 
.DKQHPDQ DQG 7YHUVN\¶V UHVHarch, it was assumed that the conditions for rational 
models hold and therefore, define optimal reasoning. On the other hand, Herbert Simon 
KDGDVNHGDIXQGDPHQWDOO\GLIIHUHQWTXHVWLRQ³+RZGRKXPDQEHLQJVreason when the 
conditions for rationality postulated by the model of neoclassical economics are not 
PHW"´  7KLV LV QRW D UKHWRULFDO TXHVWLRQ YHU\ UDUHO\ DUH WKH UHTXLUHG FRQGLWLRQV IRU
FODVVLFDOUDWLRQDOLW\PHW7KHOLPLWVRI6LPRQ¶VWKHRU\RIERXQGHGUDWLRQDOLW\FDQEHVHHQ
in former US Secretary of DHIHQFH'RQDOG5XPVIHOG¶VQRZLQIDPRXV\HWDSWUHPDUN 
³5HSRUWV WKDW VD\ WKHUH
V -- that something hasn't happened are always interesting to 
me, because as we know, there are known knowns; there are things that we know that 
we know. We also know there are known unknowns; that is to say we know there are 
some things we do not know. But there are also unknown unknowns, the ones we don't 
NQRZZHGRQ
WNQRZ´ (Rumsfeld 2002). 
A move away from rationality 
By the mid-2000s, several economists argued that any theories about rational choice 
FRXOGQRORQJHUEHFRXQWHGRQWRSURYLGH³ULJKW´DQVZHUV6WLJOLW]VWDWHGWKDW³LWVLPSO\
ZDVQ¶WWUXHWKDWDZRUOGZLWKDOPRVWSHUIHFWLQIRUPDWLRQZDVYHU\VLPLODUWRRQHLQZKLFK
WKHUHZDVSHUIHFWLQIRUPDWLRQ´ (Stiglitz 2010). George Sorros was even more damning: 
³UDWLRQDOWKHRU\LVQRORQJHUWDNHQVHULRXVO\RXWVLGHDFDGHPLFFLUFOHV´ (Sorros 2009). All 
LQ DOO ³FXPXODWLYH SURVSHFW WKHRU\´ .DKQHPDQ DQG 7YHUVN\¶V UHYLVHG DQG XSGDWH
version of prospect theory, and the experiments they had undertaken as the basis of 
their theory, had shown that assumptions about rationality were, at best, questionable. 
Individuals are successful in competitive environments without acting fully rational, and 
this irrationality can ultimately lead to orderly choices (Tversky and Kahneman 1992). 
To put it even more succinctly, if the conditions for rational decision making have not 
been satisfied, then it can be inappropriate to reason optimally.  
,QVSLUHGE\6LPRQ¶VWKHRU\RI³ERXQGHGUDWLRQDOLW\´a new breed of economist rooted in 
EHKDYLRXUDO VFLHQFHEHJDQ WRPDNHFODLPV WKDW LQGLYLGXDOV¶ DFWXDOEHKDYLRXU LVKDUGO\
rational at all. On the contrary, our judgements are made of different kinds of systematic 
deviations often referred to as biases, anomalies, or heuristics. Behavioural economists 
EHJDQWRGHYHORSPRGHOVEDVHG LQ µERXQGHGUDWLRQDOLW\¶ WRSURYLGHDQXPEHURITXDVL-
rational explanations for why individuals deviate from rational decision making. They 
also developed positive models that recognise the existence of systematic errors in the 
way people actually behave.  
Heuristics 
As the studies about judgements were still in their infancy, research was limited to 
determining how people dealt with monetary risk and determining gambling outcomes 
thURXJKµVPDOOZRUOG¶H[SHULPHQWV2XUXVHRIKHXULVWLFVKDYHEHHQUHOHJDWHGDVLQIHULRU
to complex methods for inference, or even irrational. Most of the outcomes of 
H[SHULPHQWDO µJDPHV¶ OHG WR SRRU RXWFRPHV ZKHQ DSSOLHG WR ³ODUJH-ZRUOG´ VFHQDULRV 
(Savage 1954) in "small world" games, everything is known for certain. However, when 
formalised heuristics became seen as indispensable and often more accurate than 
FRPSOH[PRGHOV,QDQXPEHURI³ODUJHZRUOG´H[SHULPHQWVVLPSOHKHXULVWLFVZHUHPRUH
accurate than standard statistical methods that have not only the same but greater 
information (Gigerenzer and Goldstein 1996).  Early indications from research designed 
to measure the effectiveness of heuristics caused Simon to claim that there has been a 
³UHYROXWLRQ LQ FRJQLWLYH VFLHQFH VWULNLQJ D JUHDW EORZ IRU VDQLW\ LQ WKH approach to 
KXPDQUDWLRQDOLW\´*LJHUHQ]HU+HUWZLJDnd Pachur 2011).  
Decision theories based on heuristics rejected the assumptions of rational choice 
WKHRU\.DKQHPDQDQG7YHUVN\¶VZRUNRQFRJQLWLYHWKLQNLQJPDGHWKHFDVHWKDW³SHRSOH
rely on a limited number of heuristic principles which reduce the complex tasks of 
DVVHVVLQJ SUREDELOLWLHV DQG SUHGLFWLQJ YDOXHV WR VLPSOHU MXGJHPHQWDO RSHUDWLRQV´ 
(Sunstein and Cass 2005, 531)  Heuristics are tools people use for a variety of complex 
decisions; for example, we deploy heuristics in order to assess probability, to predict 
values, and to decide on whether or not to trust someone. By judging probability of a 
successful outcome in uncertain circumstances, humans evolved to develop shortcuts 
WR DYRLG KDUG FDOFXODWLRQV WKURXJK WKH XVH RI FHUWDLQ ³UXOHV RI WKXPE´ RU ³PD[LPV´
µ5XOHVRIWKXPE¶XVXDOO\DUHH[SUHVVHGLQTXHVWLRQVRIXQFHUWDLQW\ZLWKDTXDQWLILHUOLNH
³ZKDW DUH WKH FKDQFHV"´ RU VWDWHPHQWV OLNH ³, WKLQN WKDW«´ RU ³,W LV XQOLNHO\ WKDW«´
Heuristic processing is passive in nature and involves using simple rules for making 
decisions rather than thoroughly examining all available information under standard 
economic models. Furthermore, research into this type of psychological phenomena 
sought to determine what was preventing individuals from optimising their own 
behaviour. From these insights the psychological phenomena discovered by Kahneman 
and Tversky has become integrated into economic reasoning. This integration lead to 
advances in the field of behavioural economics; the study of this psychological 
phenomena is commonly attributed to the Heuristics and Biases School. 
Heuristics and Biases School 
The Heuristics and Biases School took issue with the first of the two prongs posited by 
bounded rationalists. In contradiction to the standard economic model, Kahneman and 
Tversky claimed that humans are actually quite poor at decision making, regardless of 
the information available. They expressed concerns that various constituents have 
proven to be poor at maximising utility; for example, jurors use of mental heuristics 
when ascertaining facts during trials (Hastie, Penrod and Pennington 2013) and 
legislators acting on their perceived policy preferences of voters.  The reliance by Homo 
heuristicus on mental shortcuts resulted in systematic biases and error in judgements.   
While the H&B School also rejected rational choice as a positive model of choice, it 
embraced rational choice as the normative model for understanding decision making. 
7KH+	%6FKRROFDQEHFKDUDFWHULVHGDV³SHVVLPLVWLF´- they believe Homo Heuristicus 
has limited computational capacities, making him susceptible to making inaccurate 
judgements even when they have perfect information. This is in part because of our 
UHOLDQFHRQVXEVWLWXWHDWWULEXWLRQVVXFKDV³availability´, ³anchoring´DQG³salience´)RU
the H&B theorist, evaluations of consequences are often subject to change. The way we 
reason is vulnerable to both elicitation and the way the query is framed. For example, 
whether something is presented as a loss or a gain results in significant differences in 
responses (Tversky and Kahneman 1981).6 It has long been recognised that Homo 
Heuristicus acts differently when presented with extrinsic than under intrinsic rewards 
(Vohs, Mead and Goode 2006; Gneezy and Rustichini 2000).7 Consequently, less than 
maximum utility is achieved as we are prone to making both sub-optimal judgments. 
While our deployment of heuristics may be highly economical and efficient, these biases 
often cause inefficiencies during times of uncertainty.  
Although there are numerous types of heuristics, noteworthy are three classifications 
developed by the H&B School:   
x Availability: A cognitive short-cut in which the frequency or likelihood of an event 
is based on how quickly instances or associations come to mind; 
x Representativeness: a short-cut in which instances are assigned to categories of 
types on the basis of overall similarity or resemblance to the category 
x Adjustment and Anchoring: short-cut in which inferences are tied to initial 
standards or schemas. 
Kahneman subsequently went on to develop a theory of dual processing systems in 
KXPDQ WKLQNLQJ 6\VWHP RQH LV DNLQ WR ³LQWXLWLRQ´ WLUHOHVVO\ SURYLGLQJ XV ZLWK TXLFN
impressions, intentions and feelings (fast thinking). System two is more akin to reason, 
self-control and LQWHOOLJHQFH VORZ WKLQNLQJ 6\VWHP RQH ³RSHUDWHV DXWRPDWLFDOO\ DQG
TXLFNO\ZLWKOLWWOHRUQRHIIRUWDQGQRVHQVHRIYROXQWDU\FRQWURO´ (Kahneman 2011, 20) 
ZKLOH 6\VWHP WZR ³DOORFDWHVDWWHQWLRQ WR HIIRUWIXO PHQWDO DFWLYLWLHV LQFOXGLQJ FRPSOH[
calculDWLRQV´ (Kahneman 2011, 20). Dual process theories presume there is an 
interaction between the fast, associative, low-effort heuristics, and a slow, rule-based 
information processing mode based on high-effort systematic reasoning.  Dual 
processing reasoning happens routinely in our day-to-day lives. Consider someone 
needing to fly after two well-publicised airplane crashes. The initial System one reaction 
PLJKWMXVWLILFDWLRQWKHWUHSLGDWLRQRQHKDVDERXWERDUGLQJDSODQHDV³bad things happen 
in threes´ RU view the incidents as over representative of how infrequent airplane 
FUDVKHVDUHLQUHDOLW\,PDJLQHDSDVVHQJHUUHIXVLQJWRERDUGWKLQNLQJ³,WZRXOGEHMXVW
P\OXFNVRPHWKLQJEDGZRXOGKDSSHQWRPH´6\VWHPWZRDFWVWR³FDOP´WKHSDQLFNHG
voice inside RXU KHDGV RYHUULGLQJ 6\VWHP 2QH¶V LQLWLDO UHDFWLRQV 6\VWHP WZR DGGV
reason and a more realistic assessment of the risk of flying. The heuristic approximates 
the risk of flying when complete information is not available. When facing a hard 
problem of probability, the deployment of a System one heuristic results in a systematic 
error: Airplane travel is statistically speaking one of the safest forms of getting from 
place to place.  
System one processing can also be seen in the other broad categories of heuristics 
posited by Kahneman and Tversky. The availability heuristic occurs when the frequency 
of some event is estimated by judging how easy it is to recall other instances of this type 
(how "available" such instances are). This often leads to erroneous conclusions. Slovic 
et al contend that our affective responses occur rapidly and automatically (in System 
one), and that people recall the way they felt during a previous experience as a kind of 
substitute for a more systematic, all-things-considered judgment (Intuition) (Slovic 
2002).DKQHPDQDQG7YHUVN\GHWHUPLQHGWKDWZKHQXVLQJWKH³DIIHFWKHXULVWLF´SHRSOH
³DVVHVV TXHVWLRQV RI SUREDELOLW\ E\ UHIHUHQFH WR DIIHFW DQG WKDW PHWKRG OHDGV WR
SUHGLFWDEOHHUURUV´ (Cushman 2003) For the H&B theorists, these errors interfere with 
our rational decision making.  However, when a German psychologist named Gerd 
Gigerenzer was able to prove that accuracy through full disclosure was often trumped 
E\D ³OHVV-is-PRUH´KHXULVWLF WKH)DVWRI)UXJDO6FKRRORI+HXULVWLFVZDV born. When 
people rely on one good reason (and ignore the rest) it can lead to much higher 
predictive accuracy than achieved by full disclosure (or linear multiple regression) 
(Czerlinski, Gigerenzer and Goldstein 1999; Gigerenzer 1999; Gigerenzer and Todd 
1999). 
Fast and Frugal School  
Kahneman and Tversky published a series of experiments showing that the reasoning 
deployed to solve a problem exhibited fallacies. They repeatedly emphasized that 
heuristics are sometimes good and sometimes bad, but virtually every experiment 
GHVLJQHGE\WKH+	%6FKRROZDV³GHVLJQHGWRVKRZWKDWSHRSOHYLRODWHDODZRIORJLF
SUREDELOLW\ RU VRPH RWKHU VWDQGDUG RI UDWLRQDOLW\´ (Gigerenzer, Hertwig and Pachur 
2011). As a consequence, heuristics gained a negative connotation: they were seen as 
something to avoid. Furthermore, computational models were replaced by one word 
labels like anchoring, availability and representativeness. Because the nature of 
.DKQHPDQ DQG 7YHUVN\¶V ZRUN IRFXVHG RQ WKH IDOODFLHV LQ RXU UHDVRQLQJ LW ZDs 
FRPPRQO\DVVXPHGWKDWKHXULVWLFVZHUH³VHFRQG-EHVWDSSUR[LPDWLRQV´RIPRUHFRPSOH[
³RSWLPDO´ FRPSXWDWLRQV VHUYLQJ WKH SXUSRVH RI ³WUDGLQJ RII DFFXUDF\ IRU HIIRUW´ 
(Gigerenzer, Hertwig and Pachur 2011). Both schools contend that people use 
heuristics to make decisions on the basis of limited information. However, unlike the 
H&B School, proponents of the F&F approach reject rational choice theory on both 
normative and positive grounds: regulatory strategies should be assessed on the basis 
of their success or failure in real world environments. Unlike the H&B School that 
theorises that our reliance on heuristics result in errors that interfere with our ability to 
make optimal judgements, the F&F school rejected rational choice on the grounds that it 
is not indicative of how individuals actually process information.  The F&F School 
EHOLHYHV WKDW WKH PLQG LV FRPSRVHG RI D YDULHW\ RI ³PRGXODU KHXULVWLFV´8 or tools that 
evolved or learned to solve adaptive problems in either the primordial past or as 
problems present themselves (Gigerenzer 1999; Gilovich, Griffin and Kahneman 2002). 
These tools often produce lexical, one-cue solutions to judgement making and other 
decision problems. 
$V WKH +	% 6FKRRO WDNHV D ³SHVVLPLVWLF´ VWDQFH RQ WKH UROH KHXULVWLFV SOD\ LQ RXU
MXGJHPHQWPDNLQJ WKH)	)6FKRROFDQEHVDLG WREH³RSWLPLVWLF´ - heuristics are very 
good at helping us meet our proximal goals.  Not only does Homo Heuristicus have a 
biased mind and ignore part of the available information, his mind can handle 
uncertainty more efficiently and robustly than an unbiased mind relying on more 
resource-intensive and general-SXUSRVH SURFHVVLQJ VWUDWHJLHV  *LJHUHQ]HU¶V ZRUN
focused attention on the use of just one regulatory tool when it is appropriate to do so. 
The F&F School sought to answer questions about when it is appropriate to leave 
LQIRUPDWLRQRXWDV³VXUSOXV WRUHTXLUHPHQWV´7KLVDSSURDFKZDVQRWZLWKRXW LWVFULWLFV
This is because most economic models based on bounded rationality are based on a 
priori hypotheses abRXW EHKDYLRXU UDWKHU WKDQ ³JURXQGLQJ WKHP LQ IDFW HVWDEOLVKHG E\
GLUHFWREVHUYDWLRQ´ (Simon 1993, Xii)  
7KH )	) 6FKRRO YLHZ KHXULVWLFV FDXWLRXVO\ EXW ³RSWLPLVWLFDOO\´ $OWKRXJK KHXULVWLF
consistency is helpful in certain situations it may not be helpful in others; therefore, the 
F&F School advocate studying heuristic strategies. For example, where an individual 
LPLWDWHV WKH PDMRULW\ XVLQJ WKH ³LPLWDWLRQ KHXULVWLF´ (Gigerenzer and Todd 1999; 
Goldstein 2001; Heinrich 2001), the imitation may not necessarily be a bad thing. The 
)	)6FKRRODUJXHWKDWXVLQJDKHXULVWLFVKRXOGEHH[DPLQHGIRU³HFRORJLFDOUDWLRQDOLW\´
or measured by performance rather than procedure. It is an integral part of the F&F 
School that regulators need to analyse the environment to determine whether the 
phenomena reflects an unbiased mind or whether the unbiased mind tries to get along 
with the environment. If it is the latter, then does that environment have other structures 
that the regulator has not thought of? For example, consider the imitation heuristic. The 
H&B School argue that imitating someone may result in poor outcomes; however, for 
the F&F School there are plenty of examples where the relationship thrives on imitation 
like parent/child, teacher/student, and sergeant/soldier. For the F&F School, heuristics 
OLNH ³LPLWDWLRQ´ DUH URRWHG LQ RXU HYROXWLRQ DQG VKRXOG EH WHVWHG IRU performance in 
various environments.  
To explain the impact of the environment of decision making, consider the example of 
recognition KHXULVWLF¶V UROH LQ Getermining the relative size of two cities; for example, 
Chicago or Chongqing. When asked which city is larger, one will use a simple search 
rule (search first to see if one recognizes each city), a simple stopping rule (stop looking 
for other cues to city size if one recognizes one city in a pair but not the other, and a 
simple decision rule (decide that the recognized city is more populous). Subjects will 
LGHQWLI\LPPHGLDWHO\ZKLFKRIWZRFLWLHVRQH³UHFRJQL]HV´LIRQHUHFRJQL]HVEXWRQHDQG
then decide, without further reflection, that the recognized city is larger.  In Western 
environments, almost all survey participants choose Chicago even though Chongqing 
KDV DSSUR[LPDWHO\  PLOOLRQ UHVLGHQWV WR &KLFDJR¶V SDOWU\  PLOOLRQ &RQYHUVHO\ LI
one was to survey using the same question within China, most people were likely to 
choose Chongqing.  
As Kelman states: 
³Users of the [recognition] heuristic co-opt a basic psychological capacity to solve 
a problem that was not necessarily confronted when the capacity developed, 
given the features of the novel environment. In this case, the capacity they draw 
upon is the capacity to recognize, to know whether or not they have confronted in 
WKHSDVWDQREMHFW WKH\DUHQRZFRQIURQWLQJ7KH\WKHQLPSOLFLWO\³VHDUFK´Zithin 
memory to see if a city is recognized because the recognition cue permits them 
to resolve the novel judgment task, determining the relative population of the 
cities, since it turns out that a factual feature of the environment they are acting in 
is tKDWUHFRJQLWLRQFRUUHODWHVZLWKODUJHUSRSXODWLRQ´ (Kelman 2011) 
F&F theorists also argue that there are inherent risks in making decisions.  Gigerenzer 
offered four themes for thinking about risk, uncertainty, and decision making:  
1. The best decision under risk is not the best decision under certainty;  
2. Heuristics are indispensable for good decisions under certainty; they are not 
the product of a flawed mental system or mental laziness.  
3. Complex problems do not require complex solutions.  
4. More information, time, and computation are not always better. An example of 
WKLVZRXOGEHWKH³JD]HKHXULVWLF´ (Gigerenzer, Hertwig and Pachur 2011) ³7KH
gaze heuristic is the simplest one and works if the ball is already high up in the 
air: Fix your gaze on the ball, start running, and adjust your running speed so that 
the angle of gaze remains constant. A player who relies on the gaze heuristic can 
ignore all causal variables necessary to compute the trajectory of the ball²the 
initial distance, velocity, angle, air resistance, speed and direction of wind, and 
VSLQDPRQJRWKHUV´ (Gigerenzer 2004) Cricketers will use this to figure out how 
to catch a ball instead of figuring out where the ball will land using complex 
trajectory calculations (where all the variables are known).9   
*LJHUHQ]HU¶VFRQFOXGHGWKDWSHRSOHVLPSOLI\LQRUGHUWRPDNHGHFLVLRQVLQDQXQFHUWDLQ
world. This is thanks in part to evolution as humans have adapted to use these rules of 
thumb. For example, Gigerenzer determined that we often use D FODVV RI ³RQH-good-
UHDVRQ´ KHXULVWLFV WKDW RUGHU WKH FXHV LQ D JLYHQ VLWXDWLRQ 6HDUFK FRPHV WR DQ HQG
³DIWHU ILQGLQJ WKH ILUVW FXH WKDW HQDEOHV DQ LQIHUHQFH WR EHPDGH´ (Kelman 2011). We 
tend to choose the alternative this cue favours (Gigerenzer, Hertwig and Pachur 2011). 
One-good-reason heuristics were actually better at inferring from information beyond 
mere recognition than optimization strategies developed from having access to 
complete information. This conclusion was very controversial at the time. Gigerenzer 
asked his colleagues at a conference which would be more successful: take-the-best 
heuristic or multiple regression techniques ± techniques used to learn more about the 
relationship between several independent or predictor variables and a dependent or 
criterion variable. None of his fellow scientific peers predicted the take-the-best 
heuristics would be more successful.   
*LJHUHQ]HU¶V WZHQW\ VWXGLHVFRQILUPHG WKHREYLRXVKXPDQEHLQJVDUHQRW YHU\
good at predicting, but are rather good at hindsight. Ultimately, F&F theorists argue that 
there are some heuristics that work better on their own and should always be used in 
isolation, because using heuristics or rational choice only muddles the waters of the 
mind. Because these heuristics work better on their own, regulators and policy makers 
should consider designing environments that make responses to the environment more 
reliable because they are ecologically rational (Goldstein and Gigerenzer 2002).  This is 
EHFDXVHDKHXULVWLF¶VDFFXUDF\LValways relative to the structure of the environment. As 
.HOPDQVWDWHG ³WKHRUGHULQJRIFXHV OLNH WDNH-the-best may not provide the best fit to 
the observations, but when predicting new observations, it often outperforms strategies 
that achieved a better fLW´ (Kelman 2011). This begs two questions for F&F theorists: 
KRZ LVRQH¶V UHOLDQFHRQDKHXULVWLFVXVHG"$QG LV LWSRVVLEOH WRGHVLJQHQYLURQPHQWV
that encourage improvements in decision making? (Gigerenzer, Hertwig and Pachur 
2011)  
Descriptive theories of judgement and decision-making are based on the following 
psychological assumptions: 
x Independent evaluations: Every option has a value that is measured by a single 
number (options are not evaluated relative to other options, but are evaluated 
independently). 
x Exhaustive search: The value of an option is calculated by using all available 
information (for gambles, the probabilities and values for all possible outcomes). 
x Trade-offs: To calculate an option's value, low values on one attribute (e.g., a 
value) can be compensated by high values on another attribute (e.g., a 
probability).  
x Objective probabilities: The probabilities used to calculate an option's value are 
equal to the objective probabilities (the objective probabilities are not 
transformed in a nonlinear way).  
x Objective values: The outcome values used to calculate an option's value are 
equal to the objective monetary values (the objective values are not 
transformed in a non-linear way) (Katsikopoulos, Schooler and Hertwig 2010).  
Yet in the online environment, the Lessig/Murray/Laidlaw models based on rational 
choice fail to provide a comprehensive understanding of these systematic biases and 
errors that come about as a result of humans using heuristics when making judgements. 
Try as Homo Heuristicus might to make good decisions, actors often make mistakes 
assessing evidence and reasoning from means to ends.  
Rationality across Digitally Mediated Platforms  
Characteristics of the online environment may challenge assumptions about how we 
assess and implement judgement and make decisions on digitally mediated platforms. 
There are occasions not enough information is provided to make a full and rational 
decision and others where there is too much information to make a good judgement. 
Excess information may result in actors embarking on limited searches for cues. For 
example, privacy advocates have long argued that access to personal data should be a 
system of opt-in rather than opt-out.10 This policy has the potential to confuse users and 
policy makers; for instance, a data protection framework where users grant permission 
to data processors (opt-in) before collecting their data may result in users and policy 
makers systematically believing that their personal data will have more protection. As a 
consequence, users may voluntarily provide more personal data under the contractual 
IUDPHZRUNUHTXLUHGE\WKHZHEVLWHRSHUDWRU$Q³RSW-LQ´IUDPHZRUNUHTXLULQJSHUPLVVLRQ
before collecting personal data could result in misapprehension based what is 
effectively optimal disclosure.   If the F&F School is correct, then full disclosure of all the 
relevant information will produce less optimal results than disclosing the most relevant 
information. It is also possible that when people disapprove of trading access to 
SHUVRQDOGDWDIRUPRQH\WKH\DUHJHQHUDOL]LQJIURPZKDW6XQVWHLQFDOOVDVHWRI³PRUDO
principles that are generally sound, and even quite useful´ (Sunstein 2005). It may 
appear to those predisposed to believe that all harms from privacy violations were close 
to inevitable.  It might also happen because fact finders think defendants should have 
been aware of these purportedly ex ante risks ± ³VLQFHWKRVHMXGJLQJEHKDYLRXUIURPWKH
ex post perspective will suppose that, all along, they themselves did know, and others 
should have known, whatever eventuated´ (Kelman 2011). 
Consider the following example: An internet company decides to offer a new 
service or product to Internet users. Before doing so, it concludes that the best financial 
model to achieve the most sustainable growth is to offer an app for free online. An 
aggressive marketing campaign is launched to encourage users can download the app. 
By agreeing to the terms and conditions, the user expressly grants permission to the 
internet company to cROOHFW DQDO\VH DQG VHOO XVHUV¶ SHUVRQDO GDWD WR DGYHUWLVHUV
Management concludes this strategy after procuring research suggesting only 100,000 
people are willing to pay for the app for a one-time fee of £9.99, but that a free 
download would be an attractive option for tens of millions of users. The company 
GHWHUPLQHVWKDWWKHEHVWZD\WRVHFXUHDFFHVVWRXVHUV¶SHUVRQDOGDWDLVWRVWRUHLWLQD
secure farm of servers.  All information is anonymised and proportional steps are taken 
to secure personal data. The company has to decide whether or not it spends £1million 
to ensure all of its servers have a basic level of security above that minimum 
Information Commissioner recommendations or spend £20M to secure the entire server 
farm at the highest level of security. It concludes that the £20M cost is not justified. How 
would people react to this? Vicussi states that people punish organisations that base 
their decisions on cost-benefit analysis, even when a large amount of money is placed 
on human life (Viscusi 2000). The quirk here is that under Data Protection laws, the 
company would not be liable at all for any breaches if it had acted on a competent cost-
basis analysis; and might even insulate the company from a fine or sanction from the 
Information Commissioner.  
The standard economic model of rationality is based on the concept that 
obtaining and harnessing complete information is costly for the consumer. Furthermore, 
it presumes the consumer knows their own preferences and limitations. Consumers 
make decisions consistent with perceived price stability and given limitations they may 
face on time, money, and the information they have. The economic term for this is 
³UDWLRQDOXWLOLW\PD[LPLVDWLRQ´2QWKHRWKHUKDQGEHKDYLRXUDOHFRQRPLFVGHVFULEHVKRZ
people sRPHWLPHV IDLO WR EHKDYH LQ WKHLU RZQ EHVW LQWHUHVWV $ SHUVRQ¶V EHKDYLRXU LV
affected by social determinants like context, preferences, framing, experiences, and 
exposure. People also exhibit behavioural traits as self-control problems, making 
inappropriate distinctions between gains and losses, and difficulties in choosing among 
large sets of options. Behavioural economics experiments helped to identify areas 
where government intervention may be warranted when the traditional economic 
models may not. These findings have implications for effective policy interventions. How 
information is framed in the online environment can have dramatic effects on how users 
respond to that information. Policymakers must use care when designing disclosures if 
they want to acKLHYHFHUWDLQUHVXOWV&RQVLGHULQJ)XOOHU¶VSRO\FHQWULFZHEDQG0XUUD\¶V
symbiotic regulation in the online environment, this is especially apropos.  
Moving away from the rationality in the online environment 
%RWK /HVVLJ DQG 0XUUD\¶V WKHRULHV DVVXPH WKDW WKH ³UDWLRQDO´ DFWRU KDV DGDSWHG WR
his/her environment.  If this were the case, then one would only need to study the 
HQYLURQPHQW WR SUHGLFW WKH EHKDYLRXU RI /HVVLJ¶V ³SDWKHWLF´ GRW 0XUUD\¶V DFWLYH GRW
matrix does not account for irrationality among actors, and any quasi-rational behaviour 
is equalised through the volume of actors in the given environment. Again ± behaviour 
should be predictable by examining the environment. Predicting behaviour by examining 
the environment would make the study of heuristics obsolete. The online environment 
lacks the ability to provide users with the clues normally present during traditional 
methods of communication. Certain environments lack processing cues, leading users 
into making systematic errors and biases (Asch 1946; Fiske 1980; Anderson 1981; 
Wason 1966; Rosenthal and Jacobson 1968; Tversky and Kahneman 1974).  
Rationality is rooted in the concept that we make decisions when provided with the best 
information and make optimal decisions when based with clear information. On the 
contrary, users very rarely have access to complete information, nor do users seek 
complete information. Users do not calculate risks, nor compute all of the calculations 
before doing tasks normally associated with the online environment - entering into 
contracts, communicating in public forums and sharing personal data.   
Secondly the way users make decisions is paramount for understanding how regulators 
should respond to less than rational outcomes or predictable irrationality by users: If 
consumers behave rationally, regulation would be unjustified; however, if irrational 
consumers make less than optimal private choices, regulation may be justified. 
Determining whether a user is rational has implications for regulatory designs in the 
online environment. F&F theorists understand some decisions made by actors in the 
online environment may be completely rational; therefore, regulatory intervention would 
not be needed. However, the H&B School views the same actors as potentially irrational 
and that this irrationality would justify regulatory intervention. Yet for Lessig and Murray, 
rationality is at is a crucial presumption about actor behaviour in the online environment 
and sits at the heart of their regulatory theories. Consider the following example: A user 
enters into a standard contract with a social network by signing the terms and 
conditions. Within the contract there is a forum selection clause that stipulates the 
following:  
³LW LV DJUHHG« WKDW DOO GLVSXWHV DQG PDWWHUV ZKDWVRHYHU DULVLQJ XQGHU LQ
connection with or incidental to this contract shall be litigated, if at all, in and 
before an approved dispute resolution SURYLGHUORFDWHGLQWKH5HSXEOLFRI0DOWD«
WRWKHH[FOXVLRQRIWKH&RXUWRIDQ\RWKHUVWDWHRUFRXQWU\´ 
When opening their account, users are likely to pay little (or more likely no) attention to 
forum selection clauses. There are possible arguments that this either rational or 
irrational behaviour. The H&B School would argue that the user is acting irrationally, 
possibly from an optimism bias that leads users to underestimate the probability that 
they would ever need to litigate. The F&F School argue that this behaviour is completely 
rational as it is not rational to spend all the time reading all contracts more carefully 
given the time and effort that doing takes.  
How do we need to decide who is correct? There are not only opposing arguments, but 
opposiQJGHILQLWLRQVRI UDWLRQDOLW\)RU WKH µQDwYH ODZ\HU¶ D ORW LV WREHGHWHUPLQHGE\
whether a user is acting rationally. If users disregard these clauses, then the regulator 
might want to intervene. Users may make wrong choices from either the existing 
contracts available or because the existing contracts may be too limited a set.  If the 
market fails to offer contracts that some consumers would prefer, regulatory 
interventions may be justified. The consumer may be better off litigating in her home 
country, but chooses the social network that has a litigation forum in Malta. If there is a 
range of options, but chooses to ignore the forum then the H&B School would argue 
that this would be an erroneous decision. Neither of these arguments shows that the 
regulation is justified.  
The second concern regulators might have would be that the market fails to offer 
contracts that at least some users would prefer. The social network may benefit if 
litigation is inconvenient (especially if users are not aware of the inconvenience). In this 
set of assumptions, then the social network has a vested interest in making it harder for 
users to litigate and will make more money or make offerings more attractive in other 
ways. Competitors to the social network may also adopt a forum clause to their 
standard terms and conditions. Does the strength of argument to regulate change if 
consumers are rational or irrational? First assume irrationality, then rationality. However, 
this does not suppose users are rationally ignorant. The average consumer does not 
take the time to look at forum selection clauses, and it is perfectly rational for them not 
to, as it is not worth the time and effort. If users are considered to be irrational, then this 
confirms the naïve view that regulation might be justified. This does not inform us that 
irrationality is driving this conclusion. The regulator needs to compare this outcome to 
what users would do if they were acting rationally. It may be completely rational for them 
to avoid reading the terms and conditions of their contract. On this occasion, it may be 
that we need to stipulate that consumers are rationally ignorant. Does this eliminate the 
need to regulate? Of course not, as the market would still unravel in the same way.  The 
race to the bottom would continue and social networks would move towards adopting 
the same forum clause.  Sometimes what matters is the ignorance, not the rationality. 
Rational ignorance is still ignorance. If users are ignorant (for any reason) social 
networks will behave in WKHVDPHZD\7KLVEHJVWKHTXHVWLRQµZK\LVWKH³QDwYHYLHZ´
VR DWWUDFWLYH WR UHJXODWRUV"¶ ,W DIIRUGV WKH RSSRUWXQLW\ IRU UHJXODWRUV WR GHVLJQ D
regulation to solve the problem. In this case, the regulatory settlement would be 
designed to make users spending more time reading and understanding forum clauses. 
If it is rational for consumers not to spend more time reading the clauses, then this 
regulation would not be cost-justified. In other words, neither regulation nor rationality is 
monolithic. We have different regulations that influence different margins with different 
costs and benefits. Regulations may be designed to improve disclosure and regulations 
may also prohibit or require terms to be clearer.11 
At a high level of abstraction, one could suggest that both the F&F and H&B schools 
think about judgement making in the same way: heuristics are deployed whenever 
judgement or decision making is required and the amount of information available is 
incomplete or the computational abilities that some people possess are not deployed. 
Both schools agree that using less-than-optimal strategies is sometimes necessary, 
because employing optimal methods is not always an available option. For example, 
catching a ball is entirely computational. If we had all the relevant information (speed, 
wind, force of which the ball was hit), we accurately calculate where the ball would land. 
However, using a one-LQSXW JD]HKHXULVWLF LVDVXLWDEOHVROXWLRQ WR ³VROYH´ZKHUH WKH
ball will land. By keeping the eye on the ball and adjusting our running speed to ensure 
that the angle of the gaze (the angle between the eye and the ball) remains constant or 
within a small range, one can accurately determine where to run to catch the ball.  At 
the same level of abstraction, it is also ³IXQFWLRQDO´ WR XVH KHXULVWLFV  %\ GHSOR\LQJ
mental shortcuts, the answers often meet our ends well. However, these ends are often 
defined and sometimes using them becomes dysfunctional. There is widespread 
agreement that in a multi-nodal setting, one actRUPD\QRWWUHDWDQRWKHU¶VLQWHUHVWDVLILW
was their own.  Using heuristics in decision making can be exploited by those who have 
the capacity to manipulate an environment. Propagators manipulate to trigger a 
particular judgement or induce a certain type of outcome. This highlights another 
difficulty with the Lessig and Murray presumptions about rational actors. Any deceit is at 
the expense of an actor that theoretically (according to Lessig and Murray) engages in 
gathering fuller information cues or encountered (single or simple) cues that he would 
have encountered absent the manipulation (Kelman 2013).  
Conclusion 
This article has outlined the problems with rationality as a premise for regulatory models 
in the online environment. Furthermore it has suggested that regulators should move 
DZD\IURP/HVVLJ¶VFRQWURODQG0XUUD\¶VQRGDOJRYHUQDQFHPRGHOVWRZDUGDUHJXODWRU\
framework based on the way people actually behave in the online environment. This 
means the regulator has to look at the environments whereby an actor resides and then 
examine that environment for the likelihood of errors and biases when making decision 
making. Irrationality may exist through our reliance on mental shortcuts when making 
decisions. The article has also provided an overview of how the two schools of 
heuristics view human behaviour in contrasting terms. Using heuristics when making 
judgements leads to good decisions in some environments, yet in others, we are prone 
to make poor decisions. As a result, we behave less than rationally and make 
predictable errors and biases. If we are to make better laws for the online environment, 
regulators should analyse the types of decisions whereby users are prone to act less 
than rationally and subsequently form policy where necessary to compensate for any 
irrational or quasi-rational behaviour.    
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Notes  
1 >ĞƐƐŝŐ ?ƐĨĂŵŽƵƐ ‘ƉĂƚŚĞƚŝĐ ?ĚŽƚƐŝƚƚŝŶŐƉĂƐƐŝǀĞůǇĂƚƚŚĞŵĞƌĐǇŽĨĨŽƵƌŵŽĚĂůŝƚŝĞƐĂŶĚDƵƌƌĂǇ ?Ɛ ‘ĂĐƚŝǀĞĚŽƚ
ŵĂƚƌŝǆ ? ? 
2 John Locke refers to this concept as Tabula rasa (often translated "blank slate") is the notion that the 
human mind receives knowledge and forms itself based on experience alone, without any pre-existing 
innate ideas that would serve as a starting point. See Locke, J. (1841). An essay concerning human 
understanding. 
3 The key papers can be found in Daniel Kahneman, Paul Slovic, and Amos Tversky Judgment under 
Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases (1982). The heuristics-and-biases literature should be distinguished 
from the literature on prospect theory, whiĐŚŝŶǀŽůǀĞƐƚŚĞŶĂƚƵƌĞŽĨƉĞŽƉůĞ ?ƐƵƚŝůŝƚǇĨƵŶĐƚŝŽŶƐƵŶĚĞƌ
conditions of risk, not mental shortcuts under conditions of uncertainty. See Daniel Kahneman and 
Amos Tversky, Kahneman, Daniel, and Amos Tversky. "Choices, values, and frames" American 
psychologist 39.4 (1984): 341. 
4 dŚĞ “ĂĚĂƉƚŝǀĞƚŽŽůďŽǆ ?ŝƐƚŚĞĐŽůůĞĐƚŝŽŶŽĨŚĞƵƌŝƐƚŝĐƐĂŶĚďƵŝůĚŝŶŐďůŽĐŬƐĂŶŝŶĚŝǀŝĚƵĂůŽƌĂƐƉĞĐŝĞƐŚĂƐ
at its disposal for constructing heuristics, together with the core mental capacities that building blocks 
exploit. 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
5 ĂƐƐ^ƵŶƐƚĞŝŶďĞĐĂŵĞWƌĞƐŝĚĞŶƚKďĂŵĂ ?ƐƌĞŐƵůĂƚŽƌǇĐǌĂƌĂŶĚŽǁŶŝŶŐ^ƚƌĞĞƚĨŽƌŵĞĚĂĞŚĂǀŝŽƵƌĂů
^ĐŝĞŶĐĞƚĞĂŵƚŽŝŵƉůĞŵĞŶƚƚŚĞĐŽŶĐĞƉƚƐƉƵƚĨŽƌǁĂƌĚŝŶ^ƵŶƐƚĞŝŶ ?Ɛ “EƵĚŐĞ ? ? 
6 For example, when two groups of people play a game but, in the first group, it was referred to 
participants as a "competition game" and, in the other group, it was referred to as a "community game." 
In the latter, people acted less selfishly even though it was exactly the same game. See Tversky, Amos; 
Kahneman, Daniel (1981). "The Framing of decisions and the psychology of choice". Science 211 (4481): 
453 W458 
7 See for example the money experiments in Vohs, K. D., Mead, N. L., Goode, M. R. 2006. The 
psychological consequences of money. Science 314 (5802), 1154-56 and Gneezy, U., Rustichini, A., 2000. 
A fine is a price. Journal of Legal Studies 29 (2000), 1-18. 
8 sĞƌǇďƌŽĂĚůǇƐƉĞĂŬŝŶŐ ?& ?&ƚŚĞŽƌŝƐƚƐďĞůŝĞǀĞŚĞƵƌŝƐƚŝĐƐĂƌĞ “ŵĂƐƐŝǀĞůǇŵŽĚƵůĂƌŝǌĞĚ ? ?DD ?DDŝƐĂ
general theory of mental functioning, designed, in essence, to revitalize the traditional idea that the 
ŵŝŶĚƉŽƐƐĞƐƐĞƐƐƉĞĐŝĨŝĐ “ĨĂĐƵůƚŝĞƐ ?ĞĂĐŚŽĨǁŚŝĐŚĞǀŽůǀĞĚƚŽƐŽůǀĞĂĨĂŝƌůǇƉĂƌƚŝĐƵůĂƌƉƌŽďůĞŵĂŶ
organism faced rather than a more general capacity to learn and reason. These faculties ? mental 
 “ŵŽĚƵůĞƐ ? ?have a number of critical features. Most important, modules are domain-specific - they are 
devoted to solving particular problems; mandatory -people do not have any more control over the 
cognitive outputs of the modules than they have control over whether their knee reflexively rises when 
it is hit; and/or opaque- not amenable to self-conscious scrutiny; and, above all, strongly encapsulated in 
information. They draw conclusions only from the delimited set of inputs the module is designed to 
process, even if other cues might seem rationally relevant to drawing a conclusion. 
9  “dƌĂũĞĐƚŽƌŝĞƐ ?ǀĂŝůĂďůĞĂƚ Phttp://hyperphysics.phy-astr.gsu.edu/hbase/traj.html#tra3 Accessed 
12/02/2014 
10 Directive 2006/24/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 March 2006 on the 
retention of data generated or processed in connection with the provision of publicly available 
electronic communications services or of public communications networks and amending Directive 
2002/58/EC 
11 Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585 (1991), the court enforced the clauses. The court 
ĚĞĐůŝŶĞĚƚŽĐŽŶƐŝĚĞƌƚŚĞĂĚĞƋƵĂĐǇŽĨƉĂƐƐĞŶŐĞƌƐ ?ŝŶĨŽƌŵĂƚŝŽŶĂďŽƵƚƚŚŽƐĞĨŽƌƵŵƐĞůĞĐƚŝŽŶĐůĂƵƐĞƐ ?
 “ZĞƐƉŽŶĚĞŶƚƐŚĂǀĞĞƐƐĞŶƚŝĂůůǇĐŽŶĐĞĚĞĚƚŚĂƚƚŚĞǇ ŚĂĚŶŽƚŝĐĞŽĨ ?ƚŚĂƚƉƌŽǀŝƐŝŽŶ ?tŚĂƚƚŚĞƌĞƐƉŽŶĚĞŶƚƐ
ĐŽŶĐĞĚĞĚǁĂƐ “ƚŚĞƌĞƐƉŽŶĚĞŶƚƐĚŽŶŽƚĐŽŶƚĞƐƚ ?ƚŚĂƚƚŚĞĨŽƌƵŵƐĞůĞĐƚŝŽŶĐůĂƵƐĞǁĂƐƌĞĂƐŽŶĂďůǇ
ĐŽŵŵƵŶŝĐĂƚĞĚƚŽƚŚĞƌĞƐƉŽŶĚĞŶƚƐ ?ĂƐŵƵĐŚĂƐƚŚƌĞĞƉĂŐĞƐŽĨĨŝŶĞƉƌŝŶƚĐĂŶďĞĐŽŵŵƵŶŝĐĂƚĞĚ ? ?
                                                                                                                                                                                           
Respondents concede regulations aimed at greater communications might not be beneficial. But other 
regulations (such as prohibiting these clauses) might still be beneficial. 
